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THE SMALL BUSINESS LIABILITY RELIEF
AND BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION ACT:
A CRITIQUE
FLANNARY P. COLLINS
I. INTRODUCTION
In a sweeping attempt to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive
waste disposal sites, Congress in 1980 passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
1
(“CERCLA”). CERCLA’s authority extends both to Superfund
sites, the most hazardous sites in the country, and to brownfield sites.
Brownfield sites are defined by the EPA as “abandoned or underutilized industrial or commercial properties where redevelopment is
hindered by possible environmental contamination and potential liability under Superfund for parties that purchase or operate these
sites.”2 CERCLA grants the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) the authority to regulate cleanup of Superfund and brownfield sites.
Although Superfund sites are a top priority and are in the spotlight more often than brownfields, the negative effect of CERCLA on
brownfield redevelopment has stirred a great deal of debate. Criticism has been directed at CERCLA’s actual approach to brownfield
redevelopment, its effect on the redevelopment of brownfields, and
environmental, economic, and environmental justice concerns that result from its enforcement.
The most often cited problem with CERCLA’s approach to
brownfield redevelopment is its complex liability scheme. The liability scheme is criticized because of the unbalanced impact it has on

1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2000) (commonly known as the federal Superfund statute).
2. EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Brownfields Glossary of Terms,
at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/glossary.htm (last modified September 30, 1997).
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parties who have contributed minimal contamination to a site.3 Specifically, CERCLA holds all owners and operators of a brownfield
site liable for contamination, regardless of whether or not they actually contributed to the contamination.4 CERCLA’s liability scheme is
blamed for scaring off potential investors because of uncertain liabil5
ity. Another criticism of CERCLA is the authority it gives the EPA
to intervene in state brownfield programs and demand additional
6
cleanup conditions. This frustrates both developers and states in their
efforts to complete brownfield cleanups.7
In addition to the complaints regarding the approach CERCLA
takes to brownfield liability, another problem is its negative effect on
brownfield redevelopment. Landowners often choose to abandon or
mothball their property and develop on greenfields instead because
of the uncertain liability they may face. Mothballing results in an increase in urban sprawl and reduces tax revenues. Additionally, environmental justice issues are raised because poorer communities often
feel the brunt of the mothball problem since brownfields are usually
located in the more depressed communities.
Numerous stakeholders, including the EPA, the business community, community activists, individual states, and academics, have
debated for a number of years about how to rework CERCLA’s
broad regulatory approach towards brownfields. However, these interests appear inconsistent at times. The EPA, for one, is concerned
both with preserving the environment and ensuring that environmental justice issues are addressed, but the agency is also keenly
8
aware of the economic effects of its proposals. By the same token,
the primary focus of business may be economic, but the pursuit of
economic goals is closely linked with environmental concerns of
communities where the businesses are located.
Although the EPA has tried various methods to alleviate the
unwanted effect of CERCLA’s provisions on brownfield redevelopment, the agency’s methods have not been completely successful. In
3. 147 CONG. REC. H2,348, H2,349 (daily ed. May 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gillmor);
id. at H2350 (statement of Rep. Duncan).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
5. 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,892 (daily ed. April 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
6. Id. at S3884 (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
7. Environmental Financial Advisory Board, EPA, Expediting Clean-Up and Redevelopment of
Brownfields: Addressing Major Barriers to Private Sector Involvement – Real or Perceived, at
http://www.epa.gov/efinpage.htm (last modified June 28, 2000).
8. EPA, About EPA / What We Do, at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm (last
modified February 19, 2003).
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response, Congress passed the Small Business Liability Relief and
9
Brownfields Revitalization Act (the “Act”) on January 11, 2002. The
Act is an attempt to reform the strict regulatory approach of
CERCLA and address the environmental, economic and environmental justice concerns associated with brownfields and their redevelopment. Although the changes in CERCLA’s provisions have
been long awaited, the effect that the Act will have is unclear.
While the changes in the Act seem to focus adequately on the
economic and environmental justice issues involved with brownfield
redevelopment, the changes may have come at the expense of environmental concerns. Specifically, the Act’s limitation of liability of
certain purchasers of brownfield property is aimed at spurring development, increasing jobs, and encouraging the redevelopment of
10
brownfields. However, this release from liability may have a negative impact on environmental cleanup because the government will be
burdened with much of the liability and subsequent cost of cleanup.
Further, the Act’s increased grant of authority to states at the expense
of the EPA, may be problematic for brownfield redevelopment since
authorities can no longer rely on the threat of federal involvement to
induce cleanup activities.
This article will detail the approach taken toward brownfield redevelopment by CERCLA, the EPA, and the states. This article will
first examine the effect these changes have had upon brownfield redevelopment and discuss the various inadequacies that have become
apparent in the brownfield approach over the years. The article will
next turn to the changes the new Act has implemented and the intended effect of the changes. Finally, this article will compare and
contrast the desired effects with the expected actual effects that the
new Act will have upon brownfields.
II. THE BROWNFIELD PROBLEM DEFINED
The United States is home to between 500,000 and 1,000,000
11
brownfield sites. Brownfields can range from well-located sites with
light contamination and a strong private interest in redevelopment to
severely contaminated and poorly located properties with poor pros9. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675). References will be to the future codification of the Act.
10. Id.
11. EPA, President Signs Legislation to Clean Environment and Create Jobs, at http://
www.epa.gov/epahome/headline_011102.htm (last modified on March 19, 2002).
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pects for redevelopment.12 These sites range from abandoned gas sta13
tions to former industrial sites.
Brownfields have been primarily regulated by CERCLA, which
imposes liability on many parties to ensure that the private sector
14
bears the cost of cleanups. As the agency implementing CERCLA,
the EPA has two avenues to regulate cleanup: CERCLA’s trust fund
15
and the statute’s liability scheme. The EPA uses the money in the
trust fund to clean up orphaned sites where no party responsible for
the contamination can be located, where the parties can be located
but are bankrupt, or where the EPA is faced with an emergency action.16 A corporate tax imposed on industries provided the money for
the trust fund, but the tax expired in 1995.17 Neither President Clinton
18
nor President George W. Bush reauthorized the tax.
The second avenue the EPA can take to regulate brownfield
cleanup is CERCLA’s three part liability scheme. First the statute
provides for strict liability such that any party may be liable for polluting a site even if the party was making its best attempt to avoid
19
damage. Second, the statute provides for joint and several liability
where a party can be liable for the full cost of remediation even if

12. EPA, Brownfields, at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/cleabrownfields.html (last modified
February 14, 2003).
13. EPA, Proposal Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment, Revolving Loan Fund, and
Cleanup Grants - Appendix 3. Guidance on Sites Eligible for Brownfields Funding Under CERCLA
§104(k), at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/10902a3.htm (last modified December 11,
2002).
14. S. Rep No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6119, at 6136.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000).
16. EPA, Superfund Frequently Asked Questions, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/superapps/index
.cfm/fuseaction/faqs.viewAnswer/question_id/176/category_id/3/faqanswr.cfm (last modified June
30, 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
17. Katherine Q. Seelye, Superfund Dwindles, Cleanup Plans Cut, SEATTLE TIMES, February 24, 2002 at A1. The monies in the trust fund are dwindling rapidly, and unless the fund is
replenished, the trust fund will be empty by 2003. Id.
18. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); 126 CONG. REC. H11787, (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Florio) (“The standard of liability . . . is intended to be the same as that provided in section 311
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; that is strict liability.”), reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 168 (Helen Cohn Needham, ed. 1984); id. at H11788 (view of Dept.
of Justice expressed in letter to Rep. Florio) (“Caselaw construing section 311 clearly indicates
that not only are the defenses to be narrowly construed but the plain meaning of the regime establishes a strict liability standard.”), reprinted in SUPERFUND, supra at 169; S. Rep. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND, supra at 483; H. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6136; H. Rep. No. 253, Pt. 1 at 74 (SARA) (“liability
under CERCLA is strict, that is, without regard to fault or willfulness”).
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others caused the contamination.20 Third, the statute is retroactive
where a party who obeyed the laws prior to the passage of CERLCA
21
may nevertheless be held liable for cleaning up the site. Although a
few exceptions to liability are included in the statute, they are difficult
22
to establish. The EPA can bring administrative orders or legal actions against potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”).23 Additionally,
the EPA has this same power against “the current owner or operator
of a site where hazardous substances are released into the environment, prior owners or operators who are connected to the release,
certain transporters of hazardous substances to the site, and the generators of the hazardous substances.”24
In addition to the federal CERCLA, regulation of brownfields is
also governed by each state’s version of CERCLA. Like the federal
CERCLA, a state’s environmental laws establish a fund to finance
the state-led cleanups and gives the state the authority to force PRPs
25
to cleanup contamination. For example, the State of Washington’s
pollution cleanup law, the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA),26 contains a framework almost identical to CERCLA; both statutes providing for joint and several liability, setting forth specific groups of liable people, and providing for affirmative defenses.27 CERCLA and
MTCA differ in some areas, however. For example, they treat pe28
troleum production differently. Also, CERCLA requires that reme20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607; United States v. Shell Oil, 841 F. Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (2000). See also Shell Oil, 841 F. Supp. at 973 (Congress was
careful, however, to ensure that the innocent landowner exception is narrow. Thus, section
101(35)(B) requires: “To establish that the defendant had no reason to know . . . , the defendant
must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an
effort to minimize liability.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). Furthermore, in evaluating whether a
defendant has fulfilled this requirement, the Court is directed to “take into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.” Id.
23. EPA, Superfund: Finding Those Responsible, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
cleanup/superfund/find/ (last modified January 24, 2003).
24. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARVARD L. REV. 553, 594 (2001); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
25. TODD S. DAVIS & KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (1997).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D (1992 and West. Supp. 2002).
27. Id. § 70.105D.040; 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14)(F) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.020(7)(d) (2003).
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dial actions be cost-effective while there is no corresponding re29
quirement under MTCA.
Washington has used voluntary cleanup programs (“VCPs”) as
one of the primary methods of implementing MTCA’s provisions.
VCPs allow entities and individuals to avoid enforcement actions by
obtaining letters from the State Department of Ecology (“DOE”)
stating that the agency has no further intention to take action at the
contaminated site. The EPA added to the authority of states in 1995
when the Agency similarly began providing state memorandums of
agreement (“SMOA”) that granted assurances that the EPA will not
require subsequent liability after compliance with the state VCP had
been achieved.
CERCLA does not preempt state cleanup laws, and thus both
the federal CERCLA and state’s environmental laws must be applied
in determining the requirements and the liabilities for remediation of
30
a brownfield. Further, although no reformation has occurred in
some states’ laws, such as the MTCA, it is likely that protections
added to the reformed CERCLA will also be added to those laws because most other states’ cleanup laws are modeled after the
CERCLA.
A. The Problems with CERCLA
1. CERCLA’s Approach
CERCLA’s broad liability scheme made sense at the time of the
statute’s passage, because its drafting was in the wake of such events
as Love Canal and Valley of the Drums.31 These situations highlighted
the gap in the federal law for regulation of hazardous wastes.32 Before
the passage of CERCLA, no liability scheme existed for wastes generated and disposed of before the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) of 1976.33 Since RCRA applied
only to active hazardous waste sites, the federal government had no
mechanism to promptly and effectively respond to the problems created by abandoned hazardous waste sites. To fill the gap, Congress

29. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.020; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9621(a) (2000).
30. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp 1339, 1343 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
31. EPA, SUPERFUND: 20 YEARS OF PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT ch. 2, at 3 (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/
20years/ch2pg3.htm (last modified Aug. 1, 2002).
32. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6119, 6122-23.
33. Id. at 6125.
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created CERCLA and its retroactive, strict, and joint and several li34
ability scheme. The scheme ensured that all potentially responsible
parties would pay for the cleanup costs rather than the government.35
The approach seems fair on its face because it imposes the burden of
cleaning up the contamination on the parties involved with the site instead of the government or the taxpayers who were completely uninvolved with the contamination.
Although CERCLA’s broad regulatory approach did generate
the cleanup of numerous contaminated sites and put the cleanup costs
on the accountable parties, the statute also had unforeseen and un36
wanted consequences. The same scheme that caught culpable parties
also caused potential developers to shy away from redeveloping
brownfield sites due to ambiguous liability and uncertain litigation
and cleanup costs.37 The retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability scheme provided a serious disincentive for developers since all
operators and owners of a site could be held liable even though they
had not actually contributed to the contamination.
CERCLA also provided little flexibility in cleanup standards. It
required that stringent cleanup and liability standards be applied to
38
all brownfield sites. Thus, even if a developer complied with a state
VCP, the EPA could still impose additional cleanup requirements.
The ability of the EPA to intervene in state supervised cleanup projects and impose additional cleanup standards became a serious source
39
of frustration for developers and potential developers. Despite these
frustrations, the EPA had valid reasons for intervening in brownfield
redevelopment. The EPA’s main reason for intervention was due to
their rightful concern about the ineffectiveness of state law. In its
role as principal federal regulator, EPA has a significant responsibility to ensure that the appropriate parties are bearing the cost of

34. Id. at 6136; 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6136; 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
36. Thomas A. Newlon, Will Changes Speed Brownfield Cleanups?, SEATTLE DAILY J.
COM., at 1 (Aug. 21, 1997), available at http://www.djc.com/special/enviro97/10030764.html.
37. Id. at 1-2.
38. ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL ADVISORY BOARD, EPA, EXPEDITING CLEAN-UP AND
REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELDS: ADDRESSING MAJOR BARRIERS TO PRIVATE SECTOR
INVOLVEMENT – REAL OR PERCEIVED (Dec. 1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/
brncle.htm (last modified June 28, 2000).
39. Id.
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brownfield cleanup.40 Therefore, even though states have taken an active and often successful role in the redevelopment of brownfields,
EPA’s ultimate responsibility as the primary regulator has likely
caused the agency to resist relinquishing its ultimate authority.
The inflexible nature of the statute also provides no mechanism
for taking the potential future land use of a site into account in determining the extent of cleanup that is required. Although complete
cleanup of contamination is desirable, the cost of cleaning up a site
for unrestricted human use is often not proportional to the actual pro41
tection needed. For example, allowing for less stringent cleanup of a
site with a future industrial use, where higher levels of on-site contamination are acceptable, may make more sense than requiring
cleanup for unrestricted use.42
On the other hand, allowing for partial cleanup is worrisome for
numerous reasons. First, the future expected use of the site may
change, making the already completed cleanup inadequate. Inadequate cleanup further raises questions about the potential release
from liability. Namely, if the contaminator cleans up a site to the
specified allowable level, that cleanup may release the person or entity from liability for future cleanup. This release from future liability
could be problematic if additional contamination is discovered on the
site. Another problem with allowing partial cleanup is that it may re43
quire costly, ongoing monitoring by the EPA. Finally, choosing the
level of cleanup depending on future use is controversial since it may
provide an additional incentive to industrialize urban neighborhoods,
further causing concern that environmental injustice would be fur44
thered.
2. The Effects of CERCLA’s Approach
The problems created by CERCLA’s provisions, especially in its
liability scheme, have created a whole range of environmental, economic, and environmental justice issues. One of the major brownfield

40. EPA, Costs, at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/cleacosts.html (last modified Mar. 19,
2003).
41. George Wyeth, Land Use and Cleanups: Beyond the Rhetoric, 26 ENV. L. REP. 10358,
10358 (1996).
42. Id. at 10358.
43. Id. at 10362.
44. Greg Watson, Can the Natural Assets of Cities Help Address Urban Poverty?, in
NATURAL ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP Ch. 14 (James Boyce ed.,
2003).
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issues is the increase of mothballed property.45 Owners prefer to leave
brownfield sites idle rather than expose themselves to ambiguous li46
ability and uncertain litigation costs by redeveloping the property. If
the owner chooses to redevelop the property, she risks being held li47
able for cleanup by the EPA, the public, or state regulatory agencies.
However, so long as she leaves the land idle, she can avoid being held
immediately liable for cleanup costs because it is unlikely the government will investigate idle sites for possible contamination and thus
require the owner to pay any cleanup costs.48 Thus, although the
owner may place herself in a better position by mothballing the site,
the community ultimately suffers by having an eyesore in its midst
and by losing out on economic opportunities. Choosing to leave the
land idle instead of redeveloping also negatively affects tax revenue.49
Mothballing property raises environmental justice issues. The
EPA defines environmental justice as the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national
origin, or income with respect to the development of environmental
50
laws, regulations, and policies.” Environmental justice, one of the
newest paradigms for environmental protection, developed in the
1980s and 1990s as a response to the “disproportionate siting of waste
facilities and ‘dirty’ industry in poor communities of color.”51 The environmental justice concern became significant enough for President
Clinton to issue an Executive Order requiring federal agencies to focus on the issue.52 The EPA responded to the Executive Order by

45. 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,890 (daily ed. April 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Reid).
46. K. A. Dixon, Reclaiming Brownfields: From Corporate Liability to Community Assets,
Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts – Amherst, Working Paper
Series, at 4 (Jan. 2001).
47. Id.; 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,893 (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
48. Id.; D. Van Hook, Area-Wide Brownfields Planning, Remediation and Development, 11
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 743, 744 (2000).
49. EPA, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment: Brownfields Tax Incentive, at
http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/bftaxinc.htm (last modified Oct. 17, 2002). The Brownfield Tax
Incentive, amended in December 2000 as part of Public Law 106-554, was intended to remove
many of the financial disincentives preventing the cleanup and reuse of such property. While
this tax incentive costs the government approximately $300 million in annual tax revenue, it is
expected to leverage $3.4 billion in private investment and return 8,000 brownfields to productive use. This private investment will in turn generate tax revenue. Id.
50. EPA, Environmental Justice, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/
index.html (last modified Feb 27, 2003).
51. H. Patricia Hynes, The Chelsea River: Democratizing Access to Nature in a World of
Cities, in NATURAL ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP Ch. 15 (James
Boyce ed., forthcoming May 2003).
52. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1995).
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creating the Environmental Justice Strategy, which focuses on
achieving environmental justice for communities and people nationwide. The EPA’s Environmental Justice Strategy requires that environmental justice be considered at all stages of policy, guidance and
53
regulation development. The focus on environmental justice has increased the number of community-based organizations.54 The organizations have begun reclaiming their assets by rebuilding depressed
55
areas and restoring vacant degraded land into community gardens.
56
These programs have worked well to benefit blighted areas.
Regardless of these concerns, the choice to mothball remains
prominent. The choice to leave a site mothballed may seem counterintuitive since leaving a contaminated site unattended could potentially cause the cleanup costs to increase because of worsened contamination or because of a potential federal enforcement action.
However, this disincentive is lessened by the administrative reality
that the EPA is unable to investigate and prosecute many CERCLA
violations.57 Again, developers’ decision to build on greenfields negatively affect local communities, since the mothballed brownfield site
stays in their midst, the contamination remains, and no new jobs are
created.
Another result of CERCLA’s uncertain liability is the increase of
urban sprawl. Since developers tend to shy away from brownfield redevelopment, and owners choose to mothball their property, development occurs on pristine property known as greenfields. Development on greenfield sites and the resulting sprawl increases traffic
congestion, results in loss of wildlife habitat, and lowers water and air
58
quality.

53. EPA, Integration of Environmental Justice into OSWER Policy, Guidance and Regulatory Development, at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/ejndx.htm#aa (last modified Nov. 20, 2002) .
54. EPA, EJ Small Grants Program, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/
grants/ej_smgrants.html (last modified Feb. 27, 2003).
55. Hynes, supra note 51, at 5.
56. See id. See also EPA, Emerging Tools for Local Problem Solving, at http://www.
epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/ej_smgrants_emerging_tools.pdf (last modified
Feb. 27, 2003).
57. Revesz, supra note 24, at 599.
58. Thomas A. Newlon, Prospective Purchaser Agreements and Other Tools for the Redevelopment of Brownfields, ENVTL. CORP. COUNS. REP., February 1995, at 1.
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B. EPA’s Response to CERCLA’s Negative Effects on Brownfield
Redevelopment
As the federal agency with the authority to implement
CERCLA, the EPA attempted to remedy CERCLA’s negative effects by adopting several approaches to encourage brownfield redevelopment. The agency’s different approaches include providing financing, clarifying liability, and educating the public about
brownfields.59
The EPA created the Brownfield Initiative (“Initiative”) in 1993
as one attempt to remedy CERCLA’s unintended effects. The Initiative was designed to “empower states, cities, tribes, communities, and
other stakeholders in economic redevelopment to work together in a
timely manner to prevent, assess, safely clean up, and sustainably re60
use brownfields.” Specifically, the Initiative provides grant money to
assess contamination at brownfield sites, thereby leading to cleanup
and redevelopment.61 The Initiative also uses different mechanisms,
like covenants not to sue for prospective purchasers, in order to clar62
ify liability. Another goal of the Initiative is to build partnerships
amongst organizations to develop a coordinated approach to brown63
field redevelopment. Finally, the Initiative aims to educate the
community and provide job training to facilitate brownfield cleanup
and prepare the trainees for work in the environmental field.64
Although the EPA has heralded the success of the Initiative by
highlighting the money spent on brownfield revitalization, the
claimed increase of jobs due to the revitalization and the accomplishments of the various partners involved in the Initiative have been
65
challenged. The House Commerce Committee began a review of the
Initiative in 1997. The Committee has raised serious doubts about the
effectiveness of the Initiative’s approach to brownfield cleanup and
redevelopment stating in a November 2000 Report that the “EPA
cannot account for any significant environmental achievements re-

59. Dixon, supra note 46, at 5.
60. EPA, Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative Fact Sheet, at http://www.
epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/econinit.htm (last updated Oct. 2,2002).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. EPA, The Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda Accomplishments Report,
at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/npaa99/npaa9901.pdf (November 23, 1999).
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sulting from its Brownfields Initiative.”66 The report cited various
problems with the EPA’s brownfield program, including “poor management, lack of guidance and oversight by EPA, burdensome and
inflexible regulatory requirements, questionable grant awards by
EPA and use of grant funds by recipients, and EPA’s failure to track
the results of its programs and incorporate changes as necessary to
improve performance.”67 The report also found that states voluntary
cleanup programs had been more successful than EPA’s Initiative.
The Report concluded that the EPA should focus on assisting, rather
than competing, with states and should improve its own approach by
68
analyzing state brownfield programs.
The effect of EPA’s Brownfield Initiative was also questioned by
the Environmental Financial Advisory Board (“Board”), a part of the
Environmental Finance Program (“Program”). The EPA created the
Program in order to give technical assistance to communities and advice and recommendations to the EPA on environmental finance is69
sues. The Board consists of private and public sector independent
finance experts and prepares reports on diverse environmental fi70
nance matters of interest to the EPA. In 1997, the Board prepared
“Expediting Clean-Up and Redevelopment of Brownfields: Addressing
the Major Barriers to Private Sector Involvement—Real or Perceived.”
The report indicated a real need for the EPA to rework numerous areas of its Initiative in order to adequately address its goal of encouraging private sector investment in the redevelopment of brownfields.71
Areas the Board focused on included limiting the liability of innocent
purchasers and providing more cleanup flexibility in the statute.72 The
report further recommended that the EPA encourage regions to enter into State Memorandums of Agreement and develop a clear policy statement detailing the circumstances under which the EPA would
reopen an investigation of a site that has already gone through state
approved cleanup.73

66. The Committee on Com., U.S. House of Rep., The Reality Behind the Rhetoric: EPA’s
Brownfields Initiative, at http://com-notes.house.gov/brown/brown.htm (Nov. 2000).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. EPA, Environmental Finance Program – EFP, an Overview, at http://www.epa.gov/
efinpage/efp.htm (last modified August 17, 2001).
70. Environmental Financial Advisory Board, EPA, supra note 7.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The EPA’s efforts to improve CERCLA’s functionality also included attempts at introducing flexibility into the statute. As mentioned previously, the State Memorandums of Agreement were one
attempt by the EPA to make brownfield redevelopment more flexible.74 The EPA also introduced flexibility with a 1995 guidance letter
allowing consideration of the final use of the property in determining
what cleanup standard would apply to a specific site.75 The guidance
letter allowed a higher level of contamination to remain for a site
76
chosen for a future industrial land use.
Although the EPA tried various devices to alleviate CERCLA’s
negative effects on brownfield redevelopment, many of CERCLA’s
negative effects remained. Both the House Report and the Environmental Financial Advisory Board’s publication noted that the Brownfield Initiative was flawed. The Report and the Board Publication focused on various problems, including the failure of the Initiative to
spur cleanup and the EPA’s poor management in executing the Initiative.77 Beyond this, the approaches of the EPA, including state memorandums of agreement and state voluntary cleanup programs, have
not been fully successful. The failure of the EPA to fully utilize the
state memorandums of agreement and their continued secondguessing of the state voluntary cleanup programs have contributed to
their lack of success.78 EPA’s unsuccessful approach to the brownfield
problem, the problematic liability scheme, the increasing amount of
brownfield and mothballed property, and the heightened focus on environmental justice were among the many forces compelling Congress
to act to change CERCLA’s inflexible provisions.
III. THE NEW BROWNFIELD LEGISLATION
A. Changes in the Law
Members of the public and private sector who have a stake in the
redevelopment of brownfield sites have long recognized the need for
a change in CERCLA’s approach. The debate over amending
CERCLA’s regulation of brownfields began a number of years ago,
74. Id.
75. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, EPA, Land Use in the CERCLA
Remedy Selection Process, OSWER Directive No. 9355.7-04 (1995).
76. Id. at 3.
77. Environmental Financial Advisory Board, EPA, supra note 7.
78. 147 CONG. REC. S3.879, S3,894 (daily ed. April 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
(explaining the delicate compromise between states and federal agencies in drafting the bill).
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and the past eight congressional sessions have produced several dif79
ferent legislative proposals for a CERCLA retooling. The brownfield debate ultimately culminated in the passage of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act on January,
11 2002. Merging two major legislative proposals into one,80 the Act
introduced into CERCLA several amendments to the liability scheme
and other provisions affecting brownfields. Backed by both Democrats and Republicans, the Act has the support of a variety of
stakeholders, including environmental organizations, business groups,
the real estate industry, and state and local elected officials.81 Although the Act only applies to brownfield sites and not to Superfund
sites, the changes are somewhat revolutionary because they are the
first CERCLA amendments to be introduced that change its liability
scheme.
1.

Exemptions from CERCLA liability

a. Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers
Probably the most significant change in the Act is the release
from liability for bona fide prospective purchasers even if they know
about the existence of contamination at a site after conducting all ap82
propriate inquiry. The exemption applies only to those purchasing
property after the Act takes effect, and such a purchaser must show
by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) all contamination occurred prior to the time that it acquired ownership, and (2) “all appropriate inquiries” were made into the prior uses of the property in
accordance with “good commercial and customary standards and
practices.”83 The purchaser must also show that she has (1) made all
legally required disclosures of the discovery or release of any hazardous substance at the facility, (2) taken reasonable steps to stop any
continuing release and prevent any future releases, and (3) not impeded the effectiveness or integrity of any institutional controls.84

79. Charles Openchowski, Superfund in the 106th Congress, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10648,
10648 (2000).
80. The Act merged the House of Representatives passed Small Business Liability Relief
Act, H.R. 1831, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) and the Senate passed Brownfields Reform Legislation, S. 350, 107th Cong. (2001).
81. Real Estate Applauds Landmark Brownfields Law, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 11, 2002.
82. Openchowski, supra note 79, at 10648. (The Act directs EPA to develop its own regulations regarding what is all appropriate inquiry within next two years.)
83. 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(40) (West Supp. 2003).
84. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(40)(D) and (F).
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b. Contiguous Landowner Defense
The Act also exempts certain contiguous property owners from
liability.85 To fall within the contiguous landowner defense, the landowner must show (1) that she did not cause or contribute to contami86
nation, or consent to the release of a contaminant, (2) that she is unrelated to the entity that caused the contamination,87 and (3) that she
took reasonable steps regarding all appropriate inquiry, disclosures,
88
prevention of releases, and maintenance of institutional controls. If
the property owner had any prior knowledge of the contamination,
89
then the defense is unavailable.
c. Innocent Landowner Defense Clarified
The innocent landowner defense is similar to the contiguous
property owner defense in that the landowner must show she did not
cause, contribute to, or consent to the release of the contaminant.90
Further, the landowner must show that she took all reasonable steps
regarding all appropriate inquiry, disclosures, prevention of releases,
91
and maintenance of institutional controls. The defense does not apply if the owner had prior knowledge of the contamination.92 Although the Act preserves the previous innocent landowner defense, it
does provide needed clarification.
2. Windfall Profit Lien Provision
Despite the exemptions for bona fide purchasers and contiguous
property owners, if the EPA incurs response costs to clean up contaminated property and the value of the property increases as a result,
then the EPA can impose a lien on the property to recover its response costs.93

85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q) (West Supp. 2003).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q)(1)(A).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring property owners to maintain institutional
controls that may have been imposed on the contaminated property).
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q)(A)(viii)(II).
90. 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(B)(i).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B).
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(r)(2).
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3. De Micromis Exemption
Small businesses that contribute only small volumes to site contamination are also exempt from liability under the Act.94 The Act exempts parties who have contributed less that 110 gallons of liquid materials or 200 pounds of solid hazardous materials that were disposed
of, treated, or transported to a National Priorities List site prior to
95
April 1, 2001. However, the Act authorizes the government to withdraw this exemption from a particular party if: (1) it determines that
the materials contributed significantly to the cost of the response action; (2) the person failed to comply with an information request; or
(3) a person has been convicted of a criminal violation for the conduct
to which the exemption would apply.96
Residential households and businesses with fewer than 100 em97
ployees are also exempt from municipal solid waste liability if they
can show the waste they sent to a municipal landfill is not different
98
from typical residential waste. Again, the Act authorizes the government to withdraw this exemption from a party if they fall within
factors similar to the above-mentioned factors applying to individuals
who contribute small amounts of liquid material or solid hazardous
material. Specifically, the liability exemption will not apply to municipal solid waste if: (1) the government determines that the materials contributed significantly to the cost of the response action; (2) the
person failed to comply with an information request; or (3) a person
has impeded the performance of a response action.99
4. Increase of Funds for Redevelopment of Brownfield Sites
Another significant provision in the Act is the increase of funds
for redevelopment of brownfields sites from $98 million to $200 million annually through 2006.100 Entities eligible for the funds include
local and state governments, non-profit entities that own brownfield

94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(o).
95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(o)(1)(A)(B).
96. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(o)(2).
97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(p)(4). Municipal solid waste is waste material that is (1) generated
by a household; and (2) generated by a commercial, industrial, or institutional entity if the material is: (a) essentially the same as waste normally generated by a household; (b) collected and
disposed of with other municipal solid waste, and (c) contains a relative quantity of hazardous
substances no greater than the relative quantity of hazardous substances contained in waste material generated by a typical single-family household.
98. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(p)(1).
99. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(p)(2).
100. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(12)(A) (West. Supp. 2003).
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sites, and Indian tribes.101 Eligible entities can seek funds for two reasons: (1) to either inventory, characterize, assess, and conduct planning related to brownfield sites; or (2) to perform targeted site assessments.102
In order to secure a grant, the entity applies to the EPA. The
EPA will rank the grant applications based on certain criteria, including the extent to which the grant will increase the availability of
other funds for environmental assessment or remediation of a brownfield area and the potential of the proposed project to stimulate economic development and reduce threats to health and the environ103
ment. Other criteria are the extent to which the grant would
facilitate the use of existing infrastructure and the creation of parks
and other property for nonprofit purposes.104 The individual grants
are not to exceed $200,000,105 but the EPA can waive the limitation
and provide for grants up to $350,000.106 Further, the grants have
some limits. The funds cannot be used for payment of a penalty or
fine, an administrative cost, or the cost of compliance with any federal
law.107
5. Federal Enforcement Deferral
The Act further provides for a federal enforcement deferral,
meaning that if a property has been cleaned up pursuant to a state response program then, with limited exceptions, the EPA will not take
enforcement action against the site.108 This federal enforcement deferral only applies if a state (1) maintains a public record of sites where
response actions have been completed, (2) indicates whether a site is
suitable for unrestricted use, and (3) identifies any institutional controls relied upon in the remedy.109 The EPA will take a federal response action under CERCLA if a state requests federal assistance or
110
the contamination has migrated across state lines. The EPA may
also begin a response action if, after taking into account the actions
that have been taken, they determine that the release presents an
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(1).
42 U.S.C.A.§ 9604(k)(2).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(3)(C).
Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(i)(I).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(i)(II).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(4)(B)(i).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b) (West Supp. 2003).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b)(1)(C).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b)(1)(B).
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imminent and substantial endangerment and that additional remedial
111
action is needed. Finally, the EPA may initiate a response action if
there is new information that was not known at the time the initial
cleanup was approved or completed, for example where the contamination is more toxic than originally expected.112
6. Excluded Sites
Certain specified sites are excluded from the definition of brownfields under the new law.113 For example, sites listed on the National
Priorities List, where the nations most hazardous sites are listed, and
sites undergoing a removal action, corrective action or those subject
to closure under RCRA, are not considered brownfield sites. 114 The
excluded sites are generally precluded from receiving any funding
authorized under the new legislation, although the government can
determine on a case-by-case basis whether an excluded site is eligible
115
for funding.
B. Rationale of Changes
A variety of constituencies have expressed their support for the
new Act. The real estate community touted it as “a win for the environment, a win for responsible economic development and a win for
communities struggling to overcome the stigma of environmental con116
tamination.” EPA Administrator Christine Whitman stated that
“returning abandoned industrial sites to productive use can create
jobs in areas where they are very much needed and also will improve
the tax base of many communities.”117 Whitman also noted that the
Act will make brownfield cleanup more efficient, lessen the amount
of litigation, empower state cleanup plans, and deal with concerns
facing prospective purchasers of brownfields by clarifying liability.118
The National Conference of State Legislatures commended the new
Act for its creation of cleanup and redevelopment opportunities, new
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b)(1)(B)(iii).
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b)(1)(B)(iv).
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39)(C).
116. Real Estate Applauds Landmark Brownfields Law; New Law to Spur Economic Redevelopment in Blighted Communities, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 11, 2002 (quoting Real Estate
Roundtable Chairman Nelson C. Rising).
117. EPA Newsroom, Whitman Praises Passage of Brownfield Legislation, at http://www.
epa.gov/epahome/headline_122101.htm (last modified March 19, 2002).
118. Id.
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jobs, and new tax revenues.119 The reaction by the different constituencies reflects the fact that the environmental, economic, and environmental justice concerns of the various players are addressed by the
Act in varying degrees.
The Act is not without its faults. One concern is what effect the
lessening of liability and the empowerment to state VCPs will have on
environmental cleanup. Another question is whether too much focus
has been placed on economic development, rather than environmental cleanup. Further, it is unclear whether the amendments ade120
quately address environmental justice needs.
The Act has two major goals: to encourage brownfield redevelopment and to preclude the unfair liability of small businesses. The
following discussion focuses on the success of the new Act in achieving these two goals.
1.

Encourage Brownfield Redevelopment

a. Change in Liability Scheme
CERCLA’s liability scheme, which held all owners and operators
of contaminated property liable for their cost of the cleanup, regardless of who actually caused the contamination, presented a major hin121
drance to brownfield redevelopment. The amendments try to remove this hindrance by releasing from liability innocent landowners
and prospective purchasers who did not cause, contribute to, or consent to the release of hazardous substances, and who took reasonable
122
steps to stop the contamination or future release. The Act also precludes liability for businesses that have contributed de minimus waste
to sites or businesses with less than 100 workers who have disposed
only of municipal solid waste at the site.
The Act’s changes to CERCLA’s liability scheme represent a
modification of the statute’s original strategy. The changes could be
key in encouraging potential developers to invest in brownfields
rather than greenfields. The changes might have a positive effect on
lowering the amount of mothballed properties, even though liability
123
for the actual owners of mothballed properties remains. Under the
119. 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,886 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (letter from the President of
the National Conference of State Legislatures).
120. Id. at S3,893 (statement by Sen. Lieberman); id. at S3,894 (statement by Sen. Levin).
121. See supra notes 3, 5, & 7.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003) (defining “bona fide prospective purchasers”); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(r)(2) (defining “innocent landowner”).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 (discussing “innocent landowner” defense).
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Act, an owner could potentially sell the property to a new developer,
who would benefit from the Act’s exemptions from liability. However, in order to enjoy these exemptions from liability, the new developer must meet the requirements of a bona fide purchaser.124 By
encouraging developers to redevelop brownfield sites, the urban
125
sprawl issue will also be addressed. One incentive for redeveloping
on brownfield sites is that the sites are often located in areas already
supported by existing infrastructure, whereas greenfield sites may not
have the same level of infrastructure support because they, by definition, have not been previously developed.
However, the new amendments to liability have been challenged
as creating a less efficient and effective Superfund program. For example, any adverse judicial interpretation of the prospective purchaser provisions could potentially result in considerable lessening of
126
liability protection. Also, elimination of state oversight may result in
127
less effective state programs. Further, the changes implemented to
the liability scheme have been termed unnecessary128 primarily because the EPA has offered prospective purchasers of contaminated
property a covenant not to sue where the purchaser agreed to supply
environmental benefits after purchasing site since 1989.129 The Act’s
exemption simply codifies the existing policy of the EPA reflected by
the covenant not to sue.
These changes to CERCLA liability will have an effect on participation of prospective property purchasers. CERCLA’s previous
liability scheme required the participation of prospective purchasers
130
in the cleanup of contaminated sites. By releasing all prospective
purchasers from liability without having them provide anything in exchange, the new Act fails to exact any new environmental benefit.
Thus, a person purchasing property only for monetary investment
purposes, rather than redevelopment purposes, could defeat the Act’s

124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(q)(1)(A).
125. EPA Newsroom, President Signs Legislation to Clean Environment & Create Jobs, at
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline_011102.htm (last modified February 19, 2003).
126. Dale A. Guariglia, Michael Ford, & Gerald DaRosa, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: Real Relief or Prolonged Pain?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
10505, 10511 (April 2002).
127. Openchowski, supra note 79, at 10652.
128. Id. at 10660.
129. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, EPA, Guidance on Settlements with
Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, OSWER Directive No. 9835.9, reprinted in
54 Fed. Reg. 34235 (Aug. 18, 1989), modified at 60 Fed. Reg. 34792 (July 3, 1995).
130. See supra note 3.

091103COLLINS.DOC

Spring 2003]

09/24/03 3:15 PM

A CRITIQUE

323

purpose resulting in the indefinite postponement of any brownfield
131
remediation. For example, an investor could purchase a brownfield
and instead of remediating the site, he could wait for the market
forces to increase the value of the site, and then sell the site at a
profit.
The Act attempts to alleviate these concerns. First, the possibility of an investor making money in such a scenario is not high because
132
liability issues remain, reducing the value of the property. Second,
the windfall lien provision in the Act provides some protection
against the possibility of real estate speculation, but this provision has
its own gaps and problems.133 The lien still requires the EPA to expend resources to clean up a site, but the agency may not recover the
full amount of the resources expended. Further, the lien provision
ignores the EPA’s goal in brownfield remediation of encouraging the
participation of prospective purchasers in the cleanup of contaminated sites.134
The new Act problematically changes the standard of care for
prospective purchasers who find hazardous substances at the facility
135
from “due care” to “appropriate care.” Before the amendments, an
owner was required to exercise “due care” in order to be eligible for
136
the prospective purchaser defense to liability. While the Act introduces the standard of “appropriate care,” it does not appear to define
the term and thereby creates ambiguity as to the level of conduct expected of the prospective purchaser.137 However, this concern will
likely be remedied by the requirement that the EPA establish standards and practices within two years after the Act’s passage in order
to further clarify what “appropriate care” entails.138

131. Openchowski, supra note 79, at 10659.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(40) (West Supp. 2003) (bona fide prospective purchasers); 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(q) (West Supp. 2003) (contiguous landowner defense); § 9601(35)(B) (innocent
landowner defense); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(r)(2) (windfall profit lien provision); and § 9607(o) (de
micromis exemption).
133. Such gaps include connecting the response action to the increase in fair market value,
and dependence on fair market value assessment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(r)(4)(A).
134. EPA, Brownfields Mission, at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/mission.htm (last modified Sept.
30, 1997).
135. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(40)(F).
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.
137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B)(ii).
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b. Increase in Federal Funds
The Act also significantly increases the amount of federal funds
spent on brownfields from $98 million to $200 million per year.139 Although the cost of remediation for all of the nation’s brownfields significantly exceeds this amount, the hope is that private entities and
individuals will contribute private funds for remediation and reuse of
140
the sites.
Although the amount of money might not be adequate for the
cleanup of brownfields, any money is welcome. However, the plan
has a large problem in the cap it places on grants for brownfield assessment. The money allocated for each grant is limited: $200,000 for
each brownfield site characterization and assessment grant and
$1,000,000 for eligible entities to be used for capitalization of revolv141
ing loan funds. Considering the cost of successfully applying for
these grants, this cap is a drawback. Thus, receiving a $200,000 grant
may not be very beneficial when the application process represents a
large percentage of the grant.
c. Empowerment to State Voluntary Cleanup Plans
The federal enforcement deferral eliminates federal/state involvement. Brownfield redevelopers can have increased confidence
in state-approved voluntary cleanup efforts, since those efforts will no
longer be second-guessed by the federal government. Before the
amendments, the federal government reserved the right to seek additional liability from a developer even though there was compliance
with a state’s cleanup plan. Under the deferral provision, the federal
government will not require additional cleanup work once a state has
approved a voluntary cleanup plan.142 The new amendment’s prohibition of federal enforcement allows the EPA to intervene only in a few
specified instances, for example in cases where the state requests the
EPA’s assistance or when contamination has migrated across state
143
lines. The Act allows the prohibition to be overruled in situations
where the EPA determines that a site poses a public health emer-

139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(12) (West Supp. 2003).
140. Elizabeth Shogren, Congress OKs $250-Million Brownfield Cleanup, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2001, at 47 (quoting Linda Garczynski, director of the EPA’s brownfield program, commenting that “[i]t’s not a lot of money, but a little bit of federal money, or any sort of public
money, goes a long way to leverage private investments”).
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(k)(4) (West Supp. 2003).
142. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(a), (b) (West Supp. 2003).
143. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
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gency and that the state response is inadequate. 144
The deference to the states may have a negative effect on forcing
compliance. The federal enforcement deferral, coupled with the limited exceptions, introduces a much higher threshold for the EPA to
act. Further, the potential threat of federal enforcement had an important place in the brownfield redevelopment, and the Act’s grant of
increased authority to state VCPs may actually be counterproductive.
By eliminating federal oversight, the Act may undermine existing
state programs, reduce incentives for private-party cleanup, significantly reduce the impact of the liability scheme, and even lessen par145
ticipation opportunities. A 1998 report by the General Accounting
Office (“GAO”) found that the potential application of the federal
program is “an important element in obtaining the cooperation of responsible parties in the state program.”146 The GAO report further
found that states believe that “a lessening of the Superfund program’s
more rigorous cleanup requirements or liability standards could negatively affect the state programs.”147 Additionally, as has been previously discussed, the EPA has already pursued a policy allowing for a
State Memorandum of Agreement, which precludes further federal
involvement in a cleanup site, so the necessity for the federal enforcement deferral is unclear.
d. Economic Development, Environmental Justice, and Tax
Revenue
One by-product the Act hopes to produce is a benefit to communities burdened by brownfield sites. During the debate of the bill,
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, one of the Act’s primary supporters,
stated that the “real winners” are the people who live near the abandoned brownfield sites who will enjoy the renewed urban centers, the
increase in development and employment, and the revitalization of
148
the local communities. If the Act succeeds in lessening the likelihood of mothballed property and encourages brownfield redevelopment, communities will likely see increased employment opportunities. Thus, if developers choose either to continue an existing
industry or start a new one on a brownfield site, the community will
be able to take advantage of new jobs. Additionally, redeveloping
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

42 U.S.C.A. § 9628 (b)(1)(B)(iii)-(iv).
Openchowski, supra note 79, at 10660.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., Pub. No. GAO/RCED-99-39, at 15 (1998).
Id. at 3.
147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,886 (daily ed. April 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith).
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brownfields will address environmental justice issues by reducing the
149
number of brownfields located in depressed communities. By returning idle land to active use, the depressed neighborhoods will ideally be energized and will benefit both economically and environmentally. Further, the return of land to an industrial or other active use
will also benefit the depressed community and the local government
by generating previously unrealized tax revenue.150
2. Preclude Unfair Targeting of Small Businesses
Before the 2002 amendments to CERCLA, small businesses with
little money, fault, or involvement in the polluting were pulled into
court and made responsible parties for the cleanup costs associated
with polluted commercial lands.151 Under the amended CERCLA,
small businesses will not be held liable for cleanup if they did not contribute a significant amount of hazardous waste to the site.152
Some commentators object to the exclusion of small businesses
from liability, stating that the “exemptions appear to be included
153
more for political reasons and out of habit.” The reasoning behind
the small business exemption of the Act is to avoid requiring small establishments to pay huge cleanup costs when they contributed only a
de minimus amount of waste to the site.154 However, the amendment
may carry these exemptions too far because they cover disposal of
hazardous waste as well as municipal solid waste.155 Although the provision places a limit on the amount of solid waste an establishment
can contribute, it allows the entity to avoid liability even if it released
hazardous substances. Further, the necessity of a separate exemption
is not entirely clear because numerous other provisions are available
to provide liability relief to small businesses such as expedited settlements based on ability to pay and exemptions for prospective purchasers and contiguous landowners. Moreover, the need for the exemption is also placed in doubt in light of the numerous de minimis
149. Id. at S3,879 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2001) (letter from The Trust for Public Land et. al.).
150. Environmental Financial Advisory Board, EPA, Financing Strategies for Brownfield
Redevelopment (March 1996), at http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/efabfins.htm (last modified January 26, 2003); Environmental Financial Advisory Board, EPA, Financing Brownfields Redevelopment: Linkages to the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Program (March 1996), at
http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/efabezec.htm (last modified January 26, 2003).
151. 147 CONG. REC. H2348, H2350 (daily ed. May 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Costello).
152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(o) (West Supp. 2003); New Brownfields Legislation to Provide $250
Million Yearly, ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE REP. Jan. 18, 2002, at 12.
153. Openchowski, supra note 79, at 10658.
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(o).
155. Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(p).
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cash out settlements the EPA has given to small businesses over the
156
past several years.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress passed CERCLA in order to facilitate the cleanup of
hazardous substances and the cleanup of inactive waste disposal sites.
Although CERCLA was intended to provide a thorough and efficient
system for the cleanup of contaminated sites, CERCLA’s approach
actually had a negative effect on brownfield cleanup and development. The outcome of CERCLA’s approach to brownfield development has created problems in the arenas of the environment, economics, and environmental justice.
Two of the most commonly cited problems with CERCLA’s approach are the complex liability scheme and the limited authority
granted to state brownfield programs. The liability scheme, which
holds all owners and operators of a site liable for contamination regardless of how much they contributed, actually resulted in increasing
the amount of abandoned brownfield property. Potential investors
became increasingly wary of developing on brownfield sites because
of the uncertain liability they might face. Criticism has also been directed towards the EPA’s oversight role of state brownfield programs. The EPA’s ability to intervene in state programs created tension among developers, states, and the EPA and resulted in less
brownfield redevelopment.
Although the EPA attempted to introduce flexibility into
CERCLA in order to lessen the problems created by the statute’s approach, its attempts were not completely successful. Thus, after a
number of years of debate among government actors and environmental, community, and business groups, Congress passed the Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act. The recent changes in CERCLA’s provisions represent a long awaited and
needed overhaul of the statute.
The Act’s amendments introduce a more streamlined process
that is less dependent on the EPA. Although many of the amendments simply codify the existing EPA policy, the Act does add
needed clarification of CERCLA. The Act’s amendments are also
aimed at lessening the negative environmental justice and economic
impacts, while improving environmental protection. Although the effect the Act will actually have on these objectives is not entirely clear,
156. Openchowski, supra note 79, at 10658.
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the legislation is a direct response to the long debated topic of
CERCLA and its negative effects.
With its focus on lessening the liability for bona fide purchasers
and contiguous property owners, introducing federal enforcement deferral, and creating a liability exemption for small businesses, the Act
more than adequately addresses economic issues by encouraging economic participation in redevelopment of brownfield. If the Act’s goal
of encouraging brownfield redevelopment is realized, then environmental justice issues will be addressed by the resulting availability of
job opportunities, redevelopment of idle land and the increased value
and tax revenue of the sites.
Despite the economic and environmental justice benefits, the
Act’s economic bent may have come at the expense of environmental
concerns. Although the Act’s reduction of the number of liable parties may likely result in an increased redevelopment of brownfields,
the amendments may force the government, and especially the EPA,
to assume too much of the liability and its cost. The EPA’s assumption of liability and cost is especially problematic given the 1995 termination of the tax provisions funding cleanups. Additionally, the
curtailment of the EPA’s oversight authority may raise problems for
state brownfield programs since the states will no longer be able to
use the threat of federal enforcement. The result may be a decrease
in the extent of environmental cleanup. Overall, even though the
changes in the Act may present a greater burden for both the federal
and state governments, the Act represents a good faith, but possibly
flawed, attempt to facilitate brownfield redevelopment.

